

Distributed Learning Dynamics Convergence in the Routing Game and Beyond

Walid Krichene Alexandre Bayen

Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, UC Berkeley

KAUST Conference on Human-Machine Networks and
Intelligent Infrastructure
October 7, 2015

Learning dynamics in the routing game

- Routing games model congestion on networks. Concise and elegant theory.
- Nash equilibrium quantifies efficiency of network in steady state.

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
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$$x^{(t)} \rightarrow x^*$$

Convergence rates?

- **Robust** to stochastic perturbations.
 - Observation noise
 - (Bandit feedback)

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Convergence of agent dynamics
- 3 Routing Examples
- 4 Related problems

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Interaction of K decision makers

Decision maker k faces a sequential decision problem

At iteration t

- (1) chooses probability distribution $x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}$ over action set \mathcal{A}_k
- (2) discovers a loss function $\ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)} : \mathcal{A}_k \rightarrow [0, 1]$
- (3) updates distribution




Figure: Sequential decision problem.

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


Figure: Sequential decision problem.

Loss of agent k affected by strategies of other agents.

Does not know this function, only observes its value.

Write $x^{(t)} = (x_{\mathcal{A}_1}^{(t)}, \dots, x_{\mathcal{A}_K}^{(t)})$.

Examples of decentralized decision makers

Routing game

- Player drives from source to destination node
- Chooses path from \mathcal{A}_k
- Mass of players on each edge determines cost on that edge.




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


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
Online learning model

Online Learning Model

- 1: **for** $t \in \mathbb{N}$ **do**
- 2: Play $p \sim x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}$
- 3: Discover $\ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}$
- 4: Update

$$x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t+1)} = u_k \left(x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}, \ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)} \right)$$

- 5: **end for**
-




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
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
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Main problem

Define class of dynamics \mathcal{C} such that

$$u_k \in \mathcal{C} \forall k \Rightarrow x^{(t)} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$$

A brief review

Continuous-time: 

Discrete time:

- Hannan consistency: [10]
- Hedge algorithm for two-player games: [9]
- Regret based algorithms: [11]
- Online learning in games: [7]
- Potential games: [19]

Specifically to the routing game

- No-regret dynamics [4], [14]

[10] James Hannan. [Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated plays.](#)

Contributions to the Theory of Games, 3:97–139, 1957

[9] Yoav Freund and Robert E Schapire. [Adaptive game playing using multiplicative weights.](#)

Games and Economic Behavior, 29(1):79–103, 1999

[11] Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. [A general class of adaptive strategies.](#)

Journal of Economic Theory, 98(1):26 – 54, 2001

[7] Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi and Gábor Lugosi. [Prediction, learning, and games.](#)

Cambridge University Press, 2006

[19] Jason R Marden, Gürdal Arslan, and Jeff S Shamma. [Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games.](#)

Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on, 54(2):208–220, 2009

[4] Avrim Blum, Eyal Even-Dar, and Katrina Ligett. [Routing without regret: on convergence to nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games.](#)

In *Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing*, PODC '06, pages 45–52, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM

This talk

- Overview of some techniques for design and analysis of learning dynamics.
- Formulated for routing games. Extend to other classes of games.

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Nash equilibria, and the Rosenthal potential

Write

$$x = (x_{A_1}, \dots, x_{A_K}) \in \Delta^{A_1} \times \dots \times \Delta^{A_K}$$

$$\ell(x) = (\ell_{A_1}(x), \dots, \ell_{A_K}(x))$$

Nash equilibrium

x^* is a Nash equilibrium if

$$\langle \ell(x^*), x - x^* \rangle \geq 0 \quad \forall x \Leftrightarrow \forall k, \forall x_{A_k}, \langle \ell_{A_k}(x^*), x_{A_k} - x_{A_k}^* \rangle \geq 0$$

In words, for all k , paths in the support of $x_{A_k}^*$ have minimal loss.

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



Figure: Population distributions and noisy path losses

Nash equilibria, and the Rosenthal potential

Rosenthal potential

$\exists f$ convex such that

$$\nabla f(x) = \ell(x)$$

Then the set of Nash equilibria is

$$\mathcal{X}^* = \arg \min_{x \in \Delta^{A_1} \times \dots \times \Delta^{A_K}} f(x)$$

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
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$$\text{Nash condition } \forall x, \langle \ell(x^*), x - x^* \rangle \geq 0 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \text{first order optimality } \forall x, \langle \nabla f(x^*), x - x^* \rangle \geq 0$$



Regret analysis

Technique 1: Regret analysis

Regret analysis

Cumulative regret

$$R_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)} = \sup_{x_{\mathcal{A}_k} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{A}_k}} \sum_{\tau \leq t} \left\langle x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(\tau)} - x_{\mathcal{A}_k}, \ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}(x^{(\tau)}) \right\rangle$$

“Online” optimality condition. Sublinear if $\limsup_t \frac{R_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}}{t} \leq 0$.

Convergence of averages

$$\left[\forall k, R_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)} \text{ is sublinear} \right] \Rightarrow \bar{x}^{(t)} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$$

$$\bar{x}^{(t)} = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau=1}^t x^{(\tau)}. \quad \text{▶ proof}$$

Convergence of $\bar{x}(t)$ Vs. convergence of $x(t)$

Routing game example




Figure: Population distributions

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


Figure: Path losses

From convergence of $\bar{x}^{(t)}$ to convergence of $x^{(t)}$

Sufficient condition for $(x^{(t)})_t \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$

$f(x^{(t)})$ eventually decreasing

⇓

$$f(x^{(t)}) \rightarrow f^*$$

⇓

$$x^{(t)} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$$

Stochastic approximation

Technique 2: Stochastic approximation

Stochastic approximation

Idea:

- View the learning dynamics as a **discretization of an ODE**.
- Study convergence of ODE.
- Relate convergence of discrete algorithm to convergence of ODE.




Figure: Underlying continuous time

Example: the Hedge algorithm

Hedge algorithm

Update the distribution according to observed loss

$$x_a^{(t+1)} \propto x_a^{(t)} e^{-\eta_t^k \ell_a^{(t)}}$$

[7] Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi and Gábor Lugosi. *Prediction, learning, and games*. Cambridge University Press, 2006

[1] Sanjeev Arora, Elad Hazan, and Satyen Kale. [The multiplicative weights update method: a meta-algorithm and applications](#). *Theory of Computing*, 8(1):121–164, 2012

[13] Jyrki Kivinen and Manfred K. Warmuth. [Exponentiated gradient versus gradient descent for linear predictors](#). *Information and Computation*, 132(1):1 – 63, 1997

[2] Amir Beck and Marc Teboulle. [Mirror descent and nonlinear projected subgradient methods for convex optimization](#). *Oper. Res. Lett.*, 31(3):167–175, May 2003

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- Log-linear learning [5], [18]

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The replicator ODE

In Hedge $x_p^{(t+1)} \propto x_p^{(t)} e^{-\eta_t^k \ell_p^{(t)}}$, take $\eta_t \rightarrow 0$.

Replicator equation [27]

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}_k, \frac{dx_a}{dt} = x_a (\langle \ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}(x), x_{\mathcal{A}_k} \rangle - \ell_a(x)) \quad (1)$$

[27] Jörgen W Weibull. *Evolutionary game theory*. MIT press, 1997

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Theorem: [8]

Every solution of the ODE (1) converges to the set of its stationary points.

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AREP dynamics: Approximate REplicator

Discretization of the continuous-time replicator dynamics

$$x_a^{(t+1)} - x_a^{(t)} = \eta_t x_a^{(t)} \left(\left\langle \ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}(x^{(t)}), x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)} \right\rangle - \ell_a(x^{(t)}) \right) + \eta_t U_a^{(t+1)}$$

- $(U^{(t)})_{t \geq 1}$ perturbations that satisfy for all $T > 0$,

$$\lim_{\tau_1 \rightarrow \infty} \max_{\tau_2: \sum_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2} \eta_t < T} \left\| \sum_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2} \eta_t U^{(t+1)} \right\| = 0$$

- η_t discretization time steps.

(a sufficient condition is that $\exists q \geq 2$: $\sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E} \|U^{(\tau)}\|^q < \infty$ and $\sum_{\tau} \eta_{\tau}^{1+\frac{q}{2}} M_{\infty}$)


Convergence to Nash equilibria

Theorem [16]

Under AREP updates, if $\eta_t \downarrow 0$ and $\sum \eta_t = \infty$, then

$$x^{(t)} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$$

- Affine interpolation of $x^{(t)}$ is an asymptotic pseudo trajectory.



- Use f as a Lyapunov function. [▶ proof details](#)

[16] Walid Krichene, Benjamin Drighès, and Alexandre Bayen. [Learning nash equilibria in congestion games.](#)

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization (SICON), to appear, 2014


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However, **No convergence rates.**

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Stochastic convex optimization

Technique 3: (Stochastic) convex optimization

Stochastic convex optimization

Idea:

- View the learning dynamics as a **distributed algorithm to minimize f** .
- (More generally: distributed algorithm to find zero of a monotone operator).

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Here:

Class of distributed optimization methods: stochastic mirror descent.

Stochastic Mirror Descent

minimize $f(x)$ convex function
subject to $x \in \mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ convex, compact set

[21] A. S. Nemirovsky and D. B. Yudin. *Problem complexity and method efficiency in optimization*.

Wiley-Interscience series in discrete mathematics. Wiley, 1983

[20] A. Nemirovski, A. Juditsky, G. Lan, and A. Shapiro. *Robust stochastic approximation approach to stochastic programming*.

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
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Algorithm 2 MD Method with learning rates (η_t)

- 1: **for** $t \in \mathbb{N}$ **do**
 - 2: observe $\ell^{(t)} \in \partial f(x^{(t)})$
 - 3: $x^{(t+1)} = \arg \min_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \langle \ell^{(t)}, x \rangle + \frac{1}{\eta_t} D_\psi(x, x^{(t)})$
 - 4: **end for**
-

- η_t : learning rate
- D_ψ : Bregman divergence



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
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- 1: **for** $t \in \mathbb{N}$ **do**
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 - 3: $x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t+1)} = \arg \min_{x \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}_k}} \langle \ell^{(t)}, x \rangle + \frac{1}{\eta_t^k} D_{\psi_k}(x, x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)})$
 - 4: **end for**
-

- η_t : learning rate

- D_{ψ} : ▶ Bregman divergence



[21] A. S. Nemirovsky and D. B. Yudin. *Problem complexity and method efficiency in optimization*. Wiley-Interscience series in discrete mathematics. Wiley, 1983

[20] A. Nemirovski, A. Juditsky, G. Lan, and A. Shapiro. *Robust stochastic approximation approach to stochastic programming*. SIAM Journal on Optimization, 19(4):1574–1609, 2009

Stochastic Mirror Descent


minimize $f(x)$ convex function
 subject to $x \in \mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ convex, compact set

Algorithm 2 SMD Method with learning rates (η_t)

- 1: **for** $t \in \mathbb{N}$ **do**
 - 2: observe $\hat{\ell}_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}$ with $\mathbb{E} \left[\hat{\ell}_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)} \mid \mathcal{F}_{t-1} \right] \in \partial_{\mathcal{A}_k} f(x^{(t)})$
 - 3: $x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t+1)} = \arg \min_{x \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}_k}} \left\langle \hat{\ell}_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}, x \right\rangle + \frac{1}{\eta_t^k} D_{\psi_k}(x, x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)})$
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Deterministic version: a true descent

Under mirror descent, $f(\bar{x}^{(t)}) \rightarrow f^*$.

A true descent [17]

If ∇f is Lipschitz, and $\eta_t \downarrow 0$, then eventually,

$$f(x^{(t+1)}) \leq f(x^{(t)})$$

Then under mirror descent with $\sum \eta_t = \infty$,

$$f(x^{(t)}) - f^* = O\left(\frac{\sum_{\tau \leq t} \eta_\tau}{t} + \frac{1}{t\eta_t} + \frac{1}{t}\right)$$

▶ More details




Figure: Mirror Descent iteration with decreasing η_t

[17] Walid Krichene, Syrine Krichene, and Alexandre Bayen. [Convergence of mirror descent dynamics](#).

In *European Control Conference (ECC)*, 2015

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


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


Figure: Mirror Descent iteration with decreasing η_t

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In *European Control Conference (ECC)*, 2015

Stochastic version

Know: $\mathbb{E}[f(\bar{x}^{(t)})] \rightarrow f^*$ [20] (more general averaging)

f	η_t	Convergence
Weakly convex	$\frac{\theta_k}{t^{\alpha_k}}, \alpha_k \in (0, 1)$	$\mathbb{E} [f(x^{(t)})] - f^* = O\left(\sum_k \frac{\log t}{t^{\min(\alpha_k, 1-\alpha_k)}}\right)$
Strongly convex	$\frac{\theta_k}{\ell_f t^{\alpha_k}}, \alpha_k \in (0, 1]$	$\mathbb{E} [D_\psi(x^*, x^{(t)})] = O(\sum_k t^{-\alpha_k})$

Figure: SMD convergence rates [15]

General algorithm: applications beyond distributed learning models. E.g. large scale machine learning. [▶ More details](#)

[20] A. Nemirovski, A. Juditsky, G. Lan, and A. Shapiro. [Robust stochastic approximation approach to stochastic programming.](#)

SIAM Journal on Optimization, 19(4):1574–1609, 2009

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[15] Syrine Krichene, Walid Krichene, Roy Dong, and Alexandre Bayen. [Convergence of heterogeneous distributed learning in stochastic routing games.](#)

In 53rd Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing, 2015

Convergence

$$d_\tau = D_\psi(\mathcal{X}^*, x^{(\tau)}).$$

Main ingredient

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{\tau+1} | \mathcal{F}_{\tau-1}] \leq d_\tau - \eta_\tau (f(x^{(\tau)}) - f^*) + \frac{\eta_\tau^2}{2\mu} \mathbb{E}[\|\hat{\ell}^{(\tau)}\|_*^2 | \mathcal{F}_{\tau-1}]$$

[22] H. Robbins and D. Siegmund. [A convergence theorem for non negative almost supermartingales and some applications.](#)

Optimizing Methods in Statistics, 1971

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From here,

- Can show a.s. convergence $x^{(t)} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$ if $\sum \eta_t = \infty$ and $\sum \eta_t^2 < \infty$

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Deterministic version: $d_{\tau+1} \leq d_\tau - a_\tau + b_\tau$, $\sum b_\tau < \infty$.

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Optimizing Methods in Statistics, 1971

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1998

Convergence

- To show convergence $\mathbb{E} \left[f(x^{(t)}) \right] \rightarrow f^*$, generalize the technique of Shamir et al. [25] (for SGD, $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$).

Convergence of Distributed Stochastic Mirror Descent

For $\eta_t^k = \frac{\theta_k}{t^{\alpha_k}}$, $\alpha_k \in (0, 1)$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[f(x^{(t)}) \right] - f^* = \mathcal{O} \left(\sum_k \frac{\log t}{t^{\min(\alpha_k, 1 - \alpha_k)}} \right)$$

Non-smooth, non-strongly convex.

▶ [More details](#)

[25] Ohad Shamir and Tong Zhang. [Stochastic gradient descent for non-smooth optimization: Convergence results and optimal averaging schemes.](#)
In *ICML*, pages 71–79, 2013

[15] Syrine Krichene, Walid Krichene, Roy Dong, and Alexandre Bayen. [Convergence of heterogeneous distributed learning in stochastic routing games.](#)

In *53rd Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing*, 2015

Summary

- Regret analysis: convergence of $\bar{x}^{(t)}$
- Stochastic approximation: almost sure convergence of $x^{(t)}$
- Stochastic convex optimization: almost sure convergence, $\mathbb{E} [f(x^{(t)})] \rightarrow f^*$, $\mathbb{E} [D_\psi(x^*, x^{(t)})] \rightarrow 0$, convergence rates.

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Convergence of agent dynamics
- 3 Routing Examples**
- 4 Related problems

Application to the routing game




Figure: A strongly convex example.

- Centered Gaussian noise on edges.
- Population 1: Hedge with $\eta_t^1 = t^{-1}$
- Population 2: Hedge with $\eta_t^2 = t^{-1}$

Routing game with strongly convex potential




Figure: Population distributions and noisy path losses

Routing game with strongly convex potential




Figure: Distance to equilibrium.

For $\eta_t^k = \frac{\theta_k}{\ell_f t^{\alpha_k}}$, $\alpha_k \in (0, 1]$, $\mathbb{E} [D_\psi(x^*, x^{(t)})] = O(\sum_k t^{-\alpha_k})$

Routing game with weakly convex potential




Figure: A weakly convex example.

Routing game with weakly convex potential




Figure: Potential values.

For $\frac{\theta_k}{t^{\alpha_k}}$, $\alpha_k \in (0, 1)$, $\mathbb{E} [f(x^{(t)})] - f^* = O\left(\sum_k \frac{\log t}{t^{\min(\alpha_k, 1-\alpha_k)}}\right)$

Routing game with weakly convex potential




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


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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Convergence of agent dynamics
- 3 Routing Examples
- 4 Related problems**

A routing experiment

- Interface for the routing game.
- Used to collect sequence of decisions $x^{(t)}$.




Figure: Interface for the routing game experiment.

Estimation of learning dynamics

Suppose we observe

- A sequence of player decisions ($x^{(t)}$)
- The corresponding sequence of losses ($\ell^{(t)}$)

Can we **fit a model** of player dynamics?

Estimation of learning dynamics

Suppose we observe

- A sequence of player decisions ($x^{(t)}$)
- The corresponding sequence of losses ($\ell^{(t)}$)

Can we **fit a model** of player dynamics?

Simple model: estimate the learning rate in the mirror descent model

$$\tilde{x}^{(t+1)}(\eta) = \arg \min_{x \in \Delta^k} \langle \ell^{(t)}, x \rangle + \frac{1}{\eta} D_{KL}(x, x^{(t)})$$

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Then $d(\eta) = D_{KL}(x^{(t+1)}, \tilde{x}^{(t+1)}(\eta))$ is a convex function. Can minimize it to estimate $\eta_k^{(t)}$.

Estimation of learning dynamics




Figure: Learning rate estimates using the entropy model.

Optimal routing with learning dynamics

Assume

- a central authority has control over a fraction of traffic: $u^{(t)}$
- Rest of traffic follows learning dynamics: $x^{(t)}$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{minimize}_{u^{(1:T)}, x^{(1:T)}} && \sum_{t=1}^T J(x^{(t)}, u^{(t)}) \\ & \text{subject to} && x^{(t+1)} = u(x^{(t)} + u^{(t)}, \ell(x^{(t)} + u^{(t)})) \end{aligned}$$

Optimal routing with learning dynamics




Figure: Los Angeles highway network.

Optimal routing with learning dynamics




Figure: Average delay without control (dashed), with full control (solid), and different values of α .

Summary




Figure: Coupled sequential decision problems.

- Simple model for distributed learning.
- Techniques for design / analysis of learning dynamics:
Regret analysis, stochastic approximation, stochastic optimization.
- Related problems not covered here: Infinite action sets, accelerated dynamics.

Summary




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- Simple model for distributed learning.
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- Related problems not covered here: Infinite action sets, accelerated dynamics.
- Many brilliant visiting students / undergrads



Benjamin Drighès



Milena Suarez



Syrine Krichene



Kiet Lam

Thank you!

eecs.berkeley.edu/~walid/

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Continuous time model

[▶ Back](#)

Continuous-time learning model

$$\dot{x}_{\mathcal{A}_k}(t) = v_k \left(x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}, \ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}(x^{(t)}) \right)$$

- Evolution in populations: [24]
- Convergence in potential games under dynamics which satisfy a positive correlation condition [23]
- Replicator dynamics for the congestion game [8] and in evolutionary game theory [27]
- No-regret dynamics for two player games [11]

[24] William H. Sandholm. *Population games and evolutionary dynamics*. Economic learning and social evolution. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 2010. ISBN 978-0-262-19587-4

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

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Oscillating example

▶ Back

Population 1

Path losses $\ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}(x^{(t)})$  $\ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}(\bar{x}^{(t)})$ 

Population 2





Figure: Path losses

Oscillating example


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Figure: Potentials

Oscillating example

▶ Back




Figure: Trajectories in the simplex

Regret [10]

▶ Back Cumulative regret

$$R_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)} = \sup_{x_{\mathcal{A}_k} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{A}_k}} \sum_{\tau \leq t} \langle x_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(\tau)} - x_{\mathcal{A}_k}, \ell_{\mathcal{A}_k}(x^{(\tau)}) \rangle$$

Convergence of averages

$$\forall k, \limsup_t \frac{R_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}}{t} \leq 0 \Rightarrow \bar{x}^{(t)} = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} x^{(\tau)} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$$

By convexity of f ,


$$\begin{aligned} f\left(\frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} x^{(\tau)}\right) - f(x) &\leq \frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} f(x^{(\tau)}) - f(x) \\ &\leq \frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} \langle \ell(x^{(\tau)}), x^{(\tau)} - x \rangle = \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{R_{\mathcal{A}_k}^{(t)}}{t} \end{aligned}$$

[10] James Hannan. [Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated plays.](#) *Contributions to the Theory of Games*, 3:97–139, 1957

AREP convergence proof

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- Affine interpolation of $x^{(t)}$ is an asymptotic pseudo trajectory.



- The set of limit points of an APT is internally chain transitive ICT.
- If Γ is compact invariant, and has a Lyapunov function f with $\text{int } f(\Gamma) = \emptyset$, then $\forall L$ ICT, Γ , and f is constant on L .
- In particular, f is constant on $L(x^{(t)})$, so $f(x^{(t)})$ converges.

Bregman Divergence

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Bregman Divergence

Strongly convex function ψ

$$D_{\psi}(x, y) = \psi(x) - \psi(y) - \langle \nabla \psi(y), x - y \rangle$$

[2] Amir Beck and Marc Teboulle. [Mirror descent and nonlinear projected subgradient methods for convex optimization.](#)

Oper. Res. Lett., 31(3):167–175, May 2003

Bregman Divergence

▶ Back

Bregman Divergence

Strongly convex function ψ

$$D_\psi(x, y) = \psi(x) - \psi(y) - \langle \nabla \psi(y), x - y \rangle$$

Example [2]: when $\mathcal{X} = \Delta^d$

- $\psi(x) = -H(x) = \sum_a x_a \ln x_a$
- $D_\psi(x, y) = D_{KL}(x, y) = \sum_a x_a \ln \frac{x_a}{y_a}$
- The MD update has **closed form solution**

$$x^{(t+1)} \propto x_a^{(t)} e^{-\eta_t g_a^{(t)}}$$

A.k.a. Hedge algorithm, exponential weights.




Figure: KL divergence

[2] Amir Beck and Marc Teboulle. [Mirror descent and nonlinear projected subgradient methods for convex optimization.](#)

Oper. Res. Lett., 31(3):167–175, May 2003

A bounded entropic divergence

▶ Back

- $\mathcal{X} = \Delta$
- $D_{KL}(x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^d x_i \ln \frac{x_i}{y_i}$ is unbounded.

A bounded entropic divergence

▶ Back

- $\mathcal{X} = \Delta$
- $D_{KL}(x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^d x_i \ln \frac{x_i}{y_i}$ is unbounded.
- Define $D_{KL}^\epsilon(x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^d (x_i + \epsilon) \ln \frac{x_i + \epsilon}{y_i + \epsilon}$

Proposition

- D_{KL}^ϵ is $\frac{1}{1+d\epsilon}$ -strongly convex w.r.t. $\|\cdot\|_1$
- D_{KL}^ϵ is bounded by $(1 + d\epsilon) \ln \frac{1+\epsilon}{\epsilon}$.

Convergence of DMD

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Theorem: Convergence of DMD [17]

Suppose f has L Lipschitz gradient. Then under the MD class with $\eta_t \downarrow 0$ and $\sum \eta_t = \infty$,

$$f(x^{(t)}) - f^* = O\left(\frac{\sum_{\tau \leq t} \eta_\tau}{t} + \frac{1}{\eta_t} + \frac{1}{t}\right)$$

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} f(x^{(\tau)}) - f^* \leq \sum_k \frac{L_k^2}{2\ell_{\psi_k}} \sum_{\tau \leq t} \eta_\tau^k + \frac{D_k}{\eta_t^k}$$

and

$$f(x^{(t)}) - f^* \leq \frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} f(x^{(\tau)}) - f^* + O\left(\frac{1}{t}\right)$$

Convergence in DSMD

[▶ Back](#)

Regret bound [15]

SMD method with (η_t) . $\forall t_2 > t_1 \geq 0$ and \mathcal{F}_{t_1} -measurable x ,

$$\sum_{\tau=t_1}^{t_2} \mathbb{E} \left[\langle g^{(\tau)}, x^{(\tau)} - x \rangle \right] \leq \frac{\mathbb{E} [D_\psi(x, x^{(t_1)})]}{\eta_{t_1}} + D \left(\frac{1}{\eta_{t_2}} - \frac{1}{\eta_{t_1}} \right) + \frac{G}{2\ell_\psi} \sum_{\tau=t_1}^{t_2} \eta_\tau$$

Strongly convex case:

$$\mathbb{E}[D_\psi(x^*, x^{(t+1)})] \leq (1 - 2\ell_f \eta_t) \mathbb{E}[D_\psi(x^*, x^{(t)})] + \frac{G}{2\ell_\psi} \eta_t^2$$

Convergence in DSMD

▶ Back Weakly convex case:

Theorem [15]

Distributed SMD such that $\eta_t^p = \frac{\theta_p}{t^{\alpha_p}}$ with $\alpha_p \in (0, 1)$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [f(x^{(t)})] - f(x^*) &\leq \left(1 + \sum_{i=1}^t \frac{1}{i}\right) \sum_{k \in \mathcal{A}} \left(\frac{1}{t^{1-\alpha_k}} \frac{D}{\theta_k} + \frac{\theta_k G}{2\ell_\psi(1-\alpha_k)} \frac{1}{t^{\alpha_k}} \right) \\ &= O\left(\frac{\log t}{t^{\min(\min_k \alpha_k, 1 - \max_k \alpha_k)}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

Define $S_i = \frac{1}{i+1} \sum_{\tau=i}^t \mathbb{E}[f(x^{(\tau)})]$

Show $S_{i-1} \leq S_i + \left(\frac{D}{\theta} \frac{1}{t^{\alpha-1}} + \frac{\theta G}{2\ell_\psi(1-\alpha)} \frac{1}{t^\alpha}\right) \frac{1}{i}$

[15] Syrine Krichene, Walid Krichene, Roy Dong, and Alexandre Bayen. [Convergence of heterogeneous distributed learning in stochastic routing games.](#)

In *53rd Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing*, 2015

Stochastic mirror descent in machine learning

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Large scale learning:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{minimize}_x && \sum_{i=1}^N f_i(x) \\ & \text{subject to} && x \in \mathcal{X} \end{aligned}$$

N very large. Gradient prohibitively expensive to compute exactly. Instead, compute

$$\hat{g}(x^{(t)}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \nabla f_i(x^{(t)})$$

with \mathcal{I} random subset of $\{1, \dots, N\}$.

Accelerated MD

	Gradient descent	mirror decent
(stochastic) weakly convex	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}}$	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}}$
(stochastic) strongly convex	$\frac{1}{t}$	$\frac{1}{t}$
strongly convex, accelerated	$\frac{1}{t^2}$?

Figure: Convergence rates

Nesterov's accelerated method: adds a momentum term with $\alpha_t = \frac{t-1}{t+2}$

$$x^{(t)} = y^{(t-1)} - \eta \nabla f(y^{(t-1)})$$

$$y^{(t)} = x^{(t)} + \alpha_t (x^{(t)} - x^{(t-1)})$$

Accelerated MD

- A recent interpretation of Nesterov's accelerated method [26]: discretization of the ODE

$$\ddot{x}(t) + \frac{3}{t}\dot{x}(t) + \nabla f(x(t)) = 0$$
$$\dot{x}(0) = 0$$

[26] Weijie Su, Stephen Boyd, and Emmanuel Candes. [A differential equation for modeling nesterov's accelerated gradient method: Theory and insights.](#)
In *NIPS*, 2014

[21] A. S. Nemirovsky and D. B. Yudin. [Problem complexity and method efficiency in optimization.](#)

Wiley-Interscience series in discrete mathematics. Wiley, 1983

Accelerated MD

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$$\dot{x}(0) = 0$$

- Mirror descent was motivated by continuous-time dynamics [21]: Choose a Bregman divergence $D_\psi(x(t), x^*)$.

$$\dot{x}(t) = -\nabla f(\nabla\psi(x(t)))$$

Then $D_\psi(x(t), x^*)$ is a Lyapunov function for the dynamics.

[26] Weijie Su, Stephen Boyd, and Emmanuel Candes. [A differential equation for modeling nesterov's accelerated gradient method: Theory and insights.](#)

In *NIPS*, 2014

[21] A. S. Nemirovsky and D. B. Yudin. [Problem complexity and method efficiency in optimization.](#)

Wiley-Interscience series in discrete mathematics. Wiley, 1983

Accelerated MD

Lyapunov function proof

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d}{dt}D_{\psi}(x(t), x^*) &= \frac{d}{dt} (\psi(x(t)) - \psi(x^*) - \langle \nabla\psi(x^*), x(t) - x^* \rangle) \\ &= \left\langle \nabla\psi(x(t)) - \nabla\psi(x^*), \frac{d}{dt}x(t) \right\rangle \\ &= \left\langle \nabla\psi(x(t)) - \nabla\psi(x^*), -\nabla f_{\psi}(x(t)) \right\rangle \\ &\leq 0\end{aligned}$$